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Smith
Capitalism  is  a  mode  of  production  dominated  by  a  private  property  regime,  a  monetary
regime, the wage-labor nexus and a logic of accumulation. According to the classics of political
economy, such accumulation is best analysed as the fruit of the extortion of capital’s added value
and overarching reproduction (Marx, 2006 [1867]), or as the result of the ordering of behaviours
through the methodical organization of productive processes (Weber, 2008 [1905], 2014 [1921]).
In both instances, emphasis is placed upon capital’s incessant quest for profit, a quest facilitated
by  political  structuring  –with  unequal  distributions  of  power  impacting  heavily  upon  the
definition  of  questions  and  problems  seen  as  ‘legitimate’-  which  in  turn  is  reflected  in,  and
implemented by, public policies. In this way, power relations do not simply extend or orientate
the incessant quest for profit; they institute and structure it intrinsically (Palermo, 2007).
A formal separation between political and economic orders (recognized as never actually being
so neat in practice), is thus seen as providing the very conditions for accumulation: capitalism
developed because of how it was seen as the mere production of autonomous economic logics, i.e.
it was presented as simply supported or framed by ‘exterior’ political measures (Wood, 1981). The
research question posed by this special issue is thus how, in specific historical situations, power
relations contribute to imposing this division between the political and the economic, together
with the world view that accompanies it. In short, the overall aim is to document the eminently
political process through which the economic has been depoliticized in this way. Put differently,
the contributions to this special issue could tackle the following non-exhaustive list of questions:
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To what extent are forms of capitalistic accumulation determined by political structures or,
alternatively,  do they determine political  structures?  Has the financialisation of  capital
caused a specific type of political regime or, inversely, has each political regime caused
different forms of financialisation?
Has  the  fact  the  transnationalisation  of  accumulation  caused  political  transformations
entailing  the  form  of  the  state  and  of  its  territories?  How  has  accumulation  by
transnational firms and global value chains, or more sectorized forms of accumulation,
been co-produced by and with political regimes? How does the differentiated accumulation
dynamics of a sector or a region impact upon forms of political and statist organization and
and vice versa? Does this mean that certain sectors and certain regions end up being more
in tension with others than in previous eras? More generally, how do analytical approaches
developed  today  enable  one  to  grasp  or  go  beyond research  problematics  in  terms  of
regulatory capture by large firms?
What are the strengths and weaknesses of Regulationist theory in integrating analysis of
political  dynamics  with that  of  capital  accumulation? To what extent  can Field theory,
Marxism or other perspectives be made to fit within a revised Regulationist approach?
How can capital we grasped as a form of power and how can this power be distinguished
from, but nevertheless articulated with, political and symbolic power?
Accumulation as a blind spot of research by economic
sociologists and political scientists
From accumulation as key within critical political
economy to a more explicit integration of political
ordering
Regrettably  sociologists  and  political  scientists  have  hardly  ever  used  the  concept  of
accumulation in their research. Through attempting to generate responses to questions initially
posed by neo-classical economics, economic sociologists have tended to concentrate upon what
structures supply and demand, together with the formulation of prices (e.g. Callon, 2017; Callon,
Latour,  2017),  the  co-ordination  of  individual  choices  in  situations  of  uncertainty  (e.g.  Nee,
Swedberg, 2007), and the stabilization of market relationships (e.g. Fligstein, 1996, 2001). Other
sociologists have invested instead in the formulation of values, seen as occurring by a process of
adjustment  and  using  the  concept  of  ‘conventional  forms’  (Boltanski,  Esquerre,  2017).
Meanwhile,  most  political  scientists  have  ignored  or  neglected  the  question  of  accumulation.
Instead, most attention has been given to ‘varieties of capitalism’, an approach which sets out to
distinguish  between  national  configurations  which  stress  how  inter-firm co-operation  creates
equilibria which, in turn, consolidate institutions that possess a high degree of complementarity
(e.g. Hall, Soskice, 2001; Hancké, Rhodes & Thatcher, 2007; Jackson & Deeg, 2012).
Within its opposition to neo-classic economists, heterodox economists have of course placed
the issue of  accumulation at  the heart  of  their  approach.  For example,  major  post-Keynesian
analyses have sought to formalize growth models and their respective (un)stability, and this by
extending the notion of effective demand to include the long term, as well as by studying the
underlying political processes which had previously been under-studied (Robinson, 1972 [1956],
Kaldor, 1961). This said, the important contributions of Kalecki (1943) and Minsky (1986) must
be  recalled:  the  former  sought  to  show  how  dominant  classes  could  have  an  interest  in
maintaining  under-employment  and,  consequently,  opposed  governmental  reforms  aimed  at
achieving full employment and growth. As for Minsky, he conducted research which showed that
financial cycles partly create attitudes which are either favourable or unfavourable to financial
deregulation.
Meanwhile, Marxist analyses which emanated from research on imperialism sought to analyse
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Integrating politics and accumulation
the political  power relations between states as  the  consequence of  processes  of  accumulation
(Luxemburg, 1967 [1913]). For Wallerstein (1974), for example, the appropriation of added value
always favours certain states to the detriment of others, located at the periphery, which provides
the former with cheap labour and new markets and thus sources of consumption. Extensions of
these approaches can be found in research that reveals ‘dependent accumulation’ (Frank et Amin,
1978), or ‘accumulation through dispossession’ (Harvey, 2010 [2003]).
Nevertheless, virtually all of this research only treats political processes at a distance because
these are not studied around the political structures which underpin accumulation, nor is any
attention given to the relative autonomy politics may develop. By contrast, the work of Poulantzas
(2013 [1976]) did produce relatively precise data and insights concerning the processes that have
led to the structuration of the state, processes within which a site of strategic interactions emerges
in a relatively autonomous fashion that is nevertheless connected to the issue of capital. However,
his work did not manage to connect this claim with the careful study of the forms developed by
accumulation. For this reason, we consider that a structured dialogue between these two types of
literature and problematic –accumulation and politics- would be fruitful. Indeed, Regulationist
theory has already proposed a means of progressing in this direction that call for deepening.
The first strand of Regulationist Theory’s works articulated the specifically economic dynamics
of accumulation and the external political measures which support it (Aglietta, 1997 [1976]; Boyer
& Mistral, 1979). From this angle, productive and commercial activity is seen as embedded to
varying degrees in political institutions, and this with political forces being seen as compensating
for  the  impact  of  opposing  economic  forces  by  imposing  solidarity-based  rules  (Boyer  &
Hollingsworth, 1997: 435-7; Boyer, 2015). A similar perspective also marks the work of authors
who emphasize the social structuring of accumulation and who claim that politically negotiated
‘institutional orders’ channel cycles of growth (Gordon et al., 1996; Kotz, 1994).
Again in a similar vein, Bob Jessop also envisaged economic structures as being autonomous
from politics. In his view, the development of political alliances occurs between different class-
based  factions  and  in  a  separate  sphere.  Certain  ‘accumulation  strategies’  emerge  from  this
process in order to provide the linkage between economics and politics with a degree of cohesion.
Indeed, this is achieved in part by the bureaucracies of states which turn them into ‘modes of
regulation’. Jessop underlines that the fit between economic and political forces is contingent.
However, he then claims that the former nevertheless impose ‘strategic selectivity’ upon the latter
(Jessop, 1982; 1991).
Significantly, the second strand of Regulationist theory’s works has placed the study of political
regulation more at the centre of analysis of the transformation of capitalist mode of regulation. In
this way, the topological approach of Bruno Théret (1992 & 1999) relates economic and political
order, then develops an analysis of the economic regimes of each political order. More precisely,
this approach has been applied to studying the interaction between political regimes and capital
accumulation, be this virtuous or not (e.g. Marques-Pereira & Théret, 2001-2).
As for Wolfgang Streeck (2014), in his work on the ‘dismantling’ of the ‘democratic capitalism’
that developed after WW II, he argues that a specific form of accumulation has emerged over the
last half-century. He traces this trend back to the ‘revolt of capital’ that occurred in the 1970s in
order to lower the fiscal payments which they these holders of capital had accepted since the war.
This taking into account of social classes, socio-political compromises and hegemonic logics is
also at the centre of the recent research by Bruno Amable and Stefano Palombarini (2017).  In
contrast to the firm based approach developed by Hall and Soskice (2001), the transformations
experienced by French capitalism since the 1970s have their roots in the decomposing of France’s
dominant ‘social bloc’ and, consequently, in the redefinition of key political alliances. Politics is
therefore accorded significant autonomy, an axiom from which these authors set out to reveal the
political processes which have led to institutional change within different models of capitalism, all
this, however, without directly addressing the dynamics of capital accumulation.
As for Jonathan Nizan and Shimshon Bichler (2009), they have studied instead accumulation
directly in an original way which led them to conceptualize capital as a power. According to them,
emphasis should not be placed upon power relations between capital and labour but upon the
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practices of ‘sabotage’  (as defined by Veblen),  i.e.  on the propensity of  firms to restrain their
expansion in order to avoid over-production that might block capital accumulation (Nitzan  &
Bichler, 2009). This reflects the primacy of ‘differentiated accumulation’ because, in a capitalist
system,  accumulation  would  not  be  an  end  in  itself  for  them.  Rather,  the  objective  is  to
accumulate more capital than others so as to avoid being dominated by them (Nitzan, 1998). It
follows that all economic activity is founded upon the exercise of power and thus entails political
considerations (Nitzan & Bichler, 2000). However, these propositions have raised discussion over
the precise status given to politics as regards capital and accumulation (Knafo et al., 2013).
Given  all  the  above,  this  call  for  papers  aims  to  encourage  wide-ranging  debate  over  the
approaches,  and  therefore  concepts  and  methods,  which  are  best  equipped  to  grasp  the
accumulation of capital as the product of power relations which are political, and which highlight
the explanatory capacity of the processes they study. The paper proposal could question existing
readings  of  accumulation  (e.g.  that  of  Regulationist  Theory)  by  evaluating  how  a  systematic
analysis of power relations could be integrated within them. Another way of responding to our
call would be to propose alternative readings of accumulation itself through re-examining certain
social science concepts, such as those from economic sociology, political sociology (including the
sociology of public policy-making) or indeed field theory (inter alia). Propositions centred upon
the  dynamics  of  specific  sectors  would  be  welcome,  along with  others  that  question whether
national frontiers strongly define the relevant spaces within which accumulation and its multi-
scalar dimension is  best analysed.  In summary,  each proposition must  develop its  theoretical
underpinning and objectives, as well as its capacity to generate and interpret empirical data.
The final article have to be sent before November 15th 2019 to the following emails:
The articles can be written in French or English. Instructions for authors for scientific articles
of  the  Revue  de  la  Régulation  can  be  found  here:  https://journals.openedition.org
/regulation/9779
The selected articles will be evaluated through the standard peer review process.
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